Derrick Mathis v. PECO Inc by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-15-2016 
Derrick Mathis v. PECO Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Derrick Mathis v. PECO Inc" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 283. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/283 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-177        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2968 
___________ 
 
DERRICK MATHIS, 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO.;  
SHAWN LEE, Attorney for PECO Bankruptcy Department;  
GARY F. SEITZ, Trustee for the United States Bankruptcy Court 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-02234) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Action and By the Clerk for Possible  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
March 10, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 15, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Derrick Mathis appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
amended complaint.  Two appellees have filed a motion for summary affirmance, and the 
parties were notified that we would consider summary action as to the remaining appellee 
as well.  We grant the motion for summary affirmance and will affirm.  Although we are 
nominally taking summary action, Mathis has filed his brief on the merits and we have 
considered it in reaching our disposition. 
I. 
 Mathis was the debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  (E.D. Pa. Bank. No. 
11-12620.)  During that proceeding, the Philadelphia Electric Company (“PECO”) filed a 
claim for approximately $7,400.  Mathis repeatedly objected to the claim (and every 
other creditor’s claims) as fraudulent.  He also argued that the Chapter 7 trustee, Gary F. 
Seitz, committed misconduct in connection with the claim.  The Bankruptcy Court 
overruled Mathis’s objections and ordered Seitz to pay the claim, which he did.  The 
bankruptcy case was closed in January of 2014.  Mathis did not appeal. 
 Instead, and over one year later, he filed a civil action and then an amended 
complaint seeking damages from PECO and one of its attorneys (collectively, “PECO”), 
as well as Seitz.  Mathis raised essentially two claims.  First, he alleged that the $7,400 
claim was fraudulent because it was attributable to his business property rather than his 
residence and that PECO and Seitz conspired to bring that purportedly fraudulent claim 
before the Bankruptcy Court.  (Confusingly, Mathis alleged both that PECO and Seitz 
submitted fraudulent documentation in support of this claim and that Seitz improperly 
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obtained approval of this claim without submitting any documentation at all.)  Second, 
Mathis alleged that PECO was attempting to collect the same debt despite its discharge 
and that, toward that end, PECO suspended his electrical service.  Mathis purported to 
assert his claims under various federal criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 
1001, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).1 
 Both defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court, construing Seitz’s motion in part as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granted both motions and dismissed 
Mathis’s complaint.  In particular, the District Court concluded that it lacks jurisdiction 
over Mathis’s claims against Seitz and that Mathis failed to state a federal claim against 
PECO.  The District Court further declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the 
extent that Mathis’s amended complaint could be construed to assert state-law claims, 
and it denied those claims without prejudice to Mathis’s ability to assert them in state 
 court.  Mathis appeals.2 
                                              
1 Mathis also filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Utility Commission (“PUC”) 
regarding PECO’s alleged efforts to collect the discharged debt and its suspension of 
service.  The PUC dismissed Mathis’s complaint, and Mathis filed a separate civil action 
alleging that the PUC deprived him of due process by conducting an inadequate 
investigation.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-05651.)  The District Court dismissed that 
action for failure to prosecute, and Mathis did not appeal.  
 
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and we will affirm if 
the complaint fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation 
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II. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Mathis’s amended complaint as to 
PECO for the reasons it adequately explained.  In particular, the District Court properly 
determined that the criminal statutes that Mathis invoked do not create a private right of 
action.  See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing, inter 
alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001).  The District Court further properly concluded that 
Mathis failed to state a claim under the FDCPA because his allegations show that PECO 
is a direct creditor and not a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  See 
Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Creditors who 
collect in their own name and whose principal business is not debt collection are not 
subject to the [FDCPA].”) (quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the District Court acted 
well within its discretion in declining to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Mathis’s 
state-law claims and dismissing those claims without prejudice to Mathis’s ability to 
assert them in state court. 
 We will affirm the dismissal of Mathis’s amended complaint as to Seitz as well, 
though on a different ground.  The District Court dismissed Mathis’s claims against Seitz 
for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the so-called Barton doctrine.  See In re VistaCare 
Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 
(1881)).  The Barton doctrine generally deprives courts of jurisdiction over claims against 
                                                                                                                                                  
marks omitted).  We review the District Court’s decision not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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a bankruptcy trustee unless the plaintiff first obtains the Bankruptcy Court’s permission 
to assert them.  See id.  We question whether the Barton doctrine applies to Mathis’s 
claims.  See Carroll v. Abide, 788 F.3d 502, 505-06 (5th Cir. 2015); VistaCare, 678 F.3d 
at 224-25, 229-30.  We need not resolve that issue, however, because even if the Barton 
doctrine does not apply, Mathis’s claims against Seitz remain subject to dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  See Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 
127 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2016).3   
 Mathis alleges that Seitz conspired with PECO to submit and obtain payment of a 
fraudulent claim during Mathis’s bankruptcy.  The validity of PECO’s claim was 
established over Mathis’s objections during that bankruptcy, however, and Mathis did not 
appeal.  Thus, the validity of that claim no longer is subject to challenge.  Seitz’s 
payment of that claim also is not subject to challenge because Seitz was operating as an 
officer of the Bankruptcy Court in carrying out its order and is thus immune from suit.  
See, e.g., Gross v. Rell, 695 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); see also 
VistaCare, 678 F.3d at 230 (“The trustee remains, for all intents and purposes, an officer 
of the bankruptcy court.”).   
                                              
3 Courts generally must decide their jurisdiction before reaching the merits, but that 
principle applies only to questions of Article III subject matter jurisdiction.  See Jordon v. 
Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 325 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Barton doctrine is described as 
jurisdictional, but it is the product of federal common law and does not emanate from 
Article III.  See VistaCare, 678 F.3d at 225.  Thus, reaching the merits without resolving 
the Barton issue does not constitute an impermissible exercise of “hypothetical 
jurisdiction.”  Jordon, 424 F.3d at 325 n.8. 
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 Such immunity arguably may not apply to Mathis’s claim that Seitz engaged in 
fraud before the Bankruptcy Court, but Mathis’s allegations in that regard are too 
conclusory to state a claim.  Mathis does not specify how Seitz allegedly defrauded the 
Bankruptcy Court, and his conclusory allegations to that effect are inconsistent with other 
of his allegations, including that Seitz presented nothing to the Bankruptcy Court at all.  
Mathis does not argue that he could further amend his complaint to state a claim against 
Seitz in this regard, and nothing in his filings in either the District Court or this one 
suggests that he could. 
III. 
 For these reasons, the PECO appellants’ motion for summary action is granted, 
and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
                                              
4 After PECO filed its motion for summary action, our Clerk issued an order staying the 
briefing schedule.  Seitz nevertheless filed his brief but then filed a motion to withdraw it 
in light of the stay, which the Clerk granted.  Mathis filed a response in opposition to 
Seitz’s motion after the Clerk already had granted it.  To the extent that Mathis’s 
response can be construed as a motion for reconsideration of the Clerk’s Order, the 
motion is denied. 
